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VI 
JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)0") anc* pursuant to the summary judgment entered as a final judgment by the trial 
court. The appeal was referred to the Utah Court of Appeals under Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)0). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellee State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm") is dissatisfied with 
Appellant's statement of the issues on appeal. As such, State Farm submits the following 
as a correct statement of the issues on appeal: 
1. Did the district court err in granting State Farm's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and ruling that the language of the State Farm policy unambiguously limited 
the amount of coverage available to Defendant Ruby DeHerrera ("DeHerrera") to 
$50,000, regardless of the number of negligent individuals insured under the policy. 
2. Did the district court err in granting State Farm's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and ruling that the language of the State Farm policy limiting the amount of 
coverage available to DeHerrera to $50,000, regardless of the number of negligent 
insureds, did not violate Utah public policy as set forth in Utah's financial responsibility 
laws. 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
An appellate court reviews the trial court's grant of summary judgment for 
correctness, affording no special deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. See 
Girbich v. Numed. Inc., 1999 UT 37; 977 P.2d 1205. The reviewing court may affirm a 
grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even if it is not 
relied on below. See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303 (2003)1, entitled "Motor vehicle liability 
coverage," provides in relevant part: 
(l)(a) In addition to complying with the requirements of Chapter 21 and 
Part II of Chapter 22, a policy of motor vehicle liability coverage under 
Subsection 31 A-22-302(l)(a) shall: 
(ii)(A) if it is an owner's policy, designate by appropriate reference all the 
motor vehicles on which coverage is granted, insure the person named in 
the policy, insure any other person using any named motor vehicle with the 
express or implied permission of the named insured, and, except as 
provided in Subsection (7) insure any person included in Subsection 
(l)(a)(iii) against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising 
out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of these motor vehicles within the 
United States and Canada, subject to limits ... for each motor vehicle, in 
amounts not less than the minium limits specified under Section 31A-22-
304; 
(Emphasis added.) 
1
 Following the accident that is the subject of this litigation, the legislature made 
certain technical and stylistic changes to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303. While none of 
these changes affect any of the issues presented by this appeal, State Farm refers the 
Court to the statute in place at the time of the accident. 
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2. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-304, entitled "Motor vehicle liability policy 
minimum limits," provides in relevant part: 
Policies containing motor vehicle liability coverage may not limit the 
insurer's liability under that coverage below the following: 
(l)(a) $25,000 because of liability for bodily injury to or death of one 
person, arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in any one accident, 
(Emphasis added.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This case arises out of a dispute over the proper interpretation and application of 
an insurance policy. State Farm issued an automobile insurance policy to Defendant 
Robert D. Pacheco, the owner of a 2000 Pontiac Sunfire (hereinafter "Pacheco vehicle"). 
On May 11, 2003, Manuel Olmos was operating the Pacheco vehicle with the permission 
of Mr. Pacheco. Appellant Ruby DeHerrera was a backseat passenger in the vehicle. 
While Mr. Olmos was operating the Pacheco vehicle, an argument arose between the 
front seat passenger, Rae-Ann Martinez, and another passenger, Yolanda Herrera. The 
argument resulted in Ms. Martinez becoming angry and grabbing the steering wheel. Ms. 
Martinez' actions caused Mr. Olmos to lose control of the vehicle and crash. As a result 
of the accident, DeHerrera was injured. 
Following the accident, State Farm paid DeHerrera the "Each Person" limit 
(sometimes referred to as the "per person" limit) for bodily injury to one person available 
3 
under Pacheco's policy, $50,000. In exchange for this payment, DeHerrera agreed to 
release Pacheco, Olmos and Martinez from any personal liability, but retained the right to 
seek further damages to the extent there was additional liability coverage available under 
Pacheco's policy. DeHerrera contends that there is indeed additional coverage available 
under Pacheco's State Farm policy. DeHerrera claims that under the policy, State Farm is 
required to extend the per person bodily injury limit of $50,000 to each individual insured 
under the policy who allegedly bears responsibility for the accident. DeHerrera contends 
that because State Farm is required to provide coverage to Pacheco - as named-insured 
and owner of the vehicle, Olmos - as permissive user of the vehicle, and Martinez - also 
as permissive user of the vehicle, she is entitled to collect up to an additional $100,000, 
for a combined recovery of $ 150,000. 
State Farm denied DeHerrera's claim for additional compensation based on policy 
language which clearly limits the amount of available coverage to $50,000, regardless of 
the number of insureds allegedly responsible for causing the accident. On a motion for 
summary judgment, the trial court agreed that DeHerrera was not entitled to additional 
compensation under the policy. DeHerrera now appeals the trial court's ruling. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, 
On or about September 17, 2003, State Farm filed a Complaint for Declaratory 
Relief. (R. 1.) On or about June 21, 2004, DeHerrera responded by filing her Answer, 
Third Party Complaint and Cross Claim. (R. 25.) On April 14, 2005, State Farm filed its 
Motion for Summary Judgment, along with a supporting memorandum. (R 90, R. 93, 
4 
respectively.) After briefing on State Farm's motion was completed, on August 3, 2005, 
the trial court heard oral argument from the parties. (R. 147.) The trial court granted 
State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 147), and on August 19, 2005, entered 
an order declaring, as a matter of law, that the limit of liability insurance coverage 
available for all bodily injury claims by DeHerrera arising from the subject accident 
against all individuals insured under the State Farm policy was $50,000. (R. 148, R. 150.) 
C. DISPOSITION OF THE COURT. 
The trial court entered an order granting State Farm's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on August 19, 2005. (R. 148.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of this appeal, State Farm presents the following undisputed facts: 
1. Robert D. Pacheco ("Pacheco") was the owner of a 2000 Pontiac Sunfire 
which he insured through State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. (R. 63.) 
2. On May 11, 2003, Manuel Olmos ("Olmos") was the permissive user of the 
Pacheco vehicle. (R. 63.) 
3 Olmos, along with Rae-Ann Martinez ("Martinez") (as front seat 
passenger), Yolanda Herrera ("Herrera"), Angela Aragon ("Aragon"), and Ruby 
DeHerrera ("DeHerrera") (all back seat passengers), were traveling to Tooele from Salt 
Lake City on 1-80 West. (R. 63-64.) 
5 
4. While 'ATic ^ is /i:v i;; ;. .i.\ .:/- .":. r. -< ^e >rvuv-,— V *rrvie7 vM 
Her- ^ : V ^ -rir.cr r.cearr.e ansrv ar.d crabbed the steering.wheel, yanking it to the right, 
(R. 64.) 
5. Martinez' actions in grabbing the steering wheel caused Olrnos in lose 
control of the vehicle, crash through a fence, and roll several times. (See id) 
6. DeHerrera was injured as a result of the accident, and subsequently made 
claims against Pacheco, Olrnos and Martinez tor damages. • K. ^O. . 
7. V..— ra;-i ;.;: •: Perier-era v^V- icb Person" K - : ' :.i^.-. :i:i> K~ :^:it 
,-:t <-\ • Vii- available under the policv to settle her claims against Pacheco, Olrnos, and 
Martinez. (See id.) 
8. While DeHerrera has released r\:cne^;. •, -..;•:=. -. .i:\c M.:r::r:e/ :V-m .i::;-
y:<:rv*n ;i l:nnn:^ ;"v Nns v^rre-i v,v- "; : i t to claim further damages to the extent there is 
un\ additional liability coverage available under Pacheco's State Farm policy. (See id.) 
1
 For purposes of State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment, the parties 
stipulated that Pacheco, Olrnos and Martinez were all insureds under Pacheco's State 
Farm policy - Pacheco (as named-insured and owner of the insured vehicle), Olrnos (as 
permissive user of the insured vehicle), and Martinez (who grabbed the steering wheel, 
also as a permissive user of the insured vehicle). See Speros v. Fricke, 2004 UT 69; 98 
P.3d 28 (holding that a steering-wheel-grabber qualified as a permissive user and 
therefore was entitled to liability protection under the owner's policy). In addition, the 
parties have stipulated, for purposes of State Farm's motion only, that Pacheco, Olrnos, 
and Martinez each bear some responsibility for causing the subject accident. No factual 
finding of actual negligence has ever been made, In the event the Court reverses the trial 
court's decision, DeHerrera will have the burden of proving at trial that each of the three 
individual insureds were negligent and that such negligence was the cause of the subject 
accident. 
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9. State Farm has denied DeHerrera's claim for additional compensation under 
the policy. Pacheco's policy provides, in relevant part: 
Limits of Liability 
The amount of bodily injury liability coverage is shown on the declarations 
page under "Limits of Liability - Coverage A - Bodily Injury. Each Person, 
Each Accident". Under "Each Person" is the amount of coverage for all 
damages due to bodily injury to one person. "Bodily Injury to one person 
includes all injury and damages to others resulting from this bodily injury, 
and all emotional distress resulting from this bodily injury sustained by the 
other persons who do not sustain bodily injury. Under "Each Accident" is 
the total amount of coverage, subject to the amount shown under "Each 
Person", for all damages due to bodily injury to two or more persons in the 
same accident. 
We will pay damages for which an insured is legally liable up to these 
amounts. 
The limits of liability are not increased because more than one person or 
organization may be an insured. 
(R. 108.) (Italic emphasis original; underline emphasis added.) 
7 
S f > i-VIAR\ OF AKGI A1 £ > T 
• DeHerrera has largely abandoned the approach she took in opposing State Farm's 
Motion for Summary Judgment in the trial court. The primary issue presented ia iiie -raa 
court centered around the parae- .'.r.?p'j:ir._; :i;:e:Tr*Ta:icr.s o r -.:;he^ ^ State :: r-^ 
policy, Tin/ trial court agreed with State Farm's interpretation of the policy, and granted 
summary judgment in its favor. Having been unsuccessful below, DeHerrera has 
apparently chosen to take a different approach on apjre.:- .-\
 5 -.icaa .uisaaaeo e • ••*. 
DeHcrrer.; a"_/;a~ " / : .ir^a: •* ;^"vr:s mat she tailed to present to die trial 
court. While State Farm objects to DeHerrera"s attempt to raise new7 arguments on 
appeal, it is clear each of her arguments lack merit ana prov.ce no jasi:::acie ea.a.f . e* 
disturbing the trial coi ixt's ruling. 
The trial court correctly determined that Pacheco's State Farm policy limited the 
amount of liability coverage available to DeHerrera in this case to $50,000. The State 
Farm, policy provides a limit or Sao, • ' : ' a*. •_._ ~- . . ~ . ~' ;,*>::" - '- ' 
•acreased '"vjcai^e a^^e ?k;r , .-,, - -ay be an insured. DeHerrera's araament that 
Pacheco's policy provides a him: of 550,000 for bodily injury per person, per individual 
insured, is contrary to the plain language 01 me ponc:.. i'ae a ai: ...-••.•• ;. •< • ••••ci : eecre; i 
DeHerrera's interpretation of the polio- ns it would have required the court to rewrite the 
policy by inserting new language and ignoring or deleting the policy's exoress language. 
The trial court's interpretation and application of Pacneco s bta:e rami poucy is 
8 
consistent with the established rules and principles of contract interpretation, and is also 
consistent with Utah public policy. 
Despite DeHerrera's assertions to the contrary, the public policy underlying Utah's 
financial responsibility laws does not require the provision of separate liability coverage 
limits, per negligent insured, for bodily injury to one person. Utah public policy, as set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-22-303, -304, clearly connects the required coverage to 
the particular insured motor vehicle, not the negligent individual(s) insured under the 
policy. Thus, the trial court correctly determined that Pacheco's State Farm policy did not 
violate Utah public policy. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DeHERRERA ATTEMPTS TO RAISE ON APPEAL ARGUMENTS 
WHICH SHE FAILED TO RAISE IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
The primary issue presented to the trial court was one of contract interpretation. In 
its summary judgment briefing, State Farm demonstrated how the plain language of 
Pacheco's policy clearly limited the amount of liability coverage available to DeHerrera to 
the "Each Person" bodily injury limit of $50,000, regardless of the number of individuals 
insured under the policy. (R. 90.) In her memorandum opposing State Farm's motion, 
DeHerrera disagreed with State Farm's interpretation and proceeded to offer her own. (R. 
115.) DeHerrera argued that the Pacheco policy clearly provided liability coverage of 
$50,000, per person, for each individual insured under the policy. (R. 122.) Thus, DeHerrera 
claimed that because there were three individuals insured under the policy (Pacheco, Olmos, 
9 
an.: \ : ; ; . i u , , ^r.i- ^ o:;:;t.e ^ * — — ''* ^ • • . -:' .-^N ' ^ ' ' »00 in liability coverage. (R. 
DeHerrera also argued that State Farm's interpretation of the policy violated the 
minimum statutory requirements set forth in Utah Code Ann. § J I A - 2 2 - 3 ' M 111"" 12s.) 
DeHerrera asserre*: &/,\~ "ocris^ a >:-/:o Fmit of $50,000, divided between the three insured 
individuals, would result in each receiving only SI6,666.66 of liability protection. State 
Farm's interpretation would result in each insured recen mg icss man i::e :Uu., . . :. . . 
minimum of 1>2 5,i)0<> fur buddy iniur\ (u uiie persi -\ ' 2 * ) vv'iiiie these were the 
arguments DeHerrera made in opposing State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment before 
the trial court, DeHerrera has chosen to present new arguments on appeal. 
For the tirst tune, DeHerrera a.^ ert.-. that ihe trial court's decision granting State 
Far::: - M----. •>- f-: ^ -v.v.-•-- Judgment was erroneous because the court failed to apply or 
consider the mandates of I'tahf s "omnibus" statute, as found in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-
303.3 (Appellant's Brief, p. 10.^  ^ii^ng to a few eases from ouioijc aaa.^aoi:or:^ Lei-ierrera 
arg'-.c^ ,'.:a; ' -^  - " •—- \^:" •>: V V -V (U'-.> v/>r* .r *-- • , provide $50,000 of separate 
liability coverage for each insured under Pacheco' s State Farm policy. DeHerrera also argues 
DeHerrera begins her brief by stating that "[a]t the heart of this controversy is the 
Utah omnibus statute. . / ' (Appellee's Brief, p. 10.) If Utah's "omnibus" statute was 
truly "at the heart of this controversy," one would expect that DeHerrera would have at 
the very least referred to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303 or mentioned the word 
"omnibus" in her opposition memorandum and argument before the trial court, and not 
for the first time on appeal. 
10 
that the trial court's interpretation of the State Farm policy is erroneous because it violates 
the public policy underlying the "omnibus" statute. (Appellant's Brief, p. 26.) In addition, 
DeHerrera argues for the first time on appeal that the trial court's decision is erroneous 
because the State Farm policy contains an "unlawful, implied step-down provision." 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 30.) 
State Farm objects to DeHerrera's attempt to present new arguments for the first time 
on appeal. DeHerrera's briefing and argument to the trial court contains no mention of 
Utah's "omnibus" statute, nor does it contain a single citation to any of the case law from 
outside jurisdictions which she now attempts to use in support of her position.4 Furthermore, 
DeHerrera never argued to the trial court that the State Farm policy contained an "unlawful, 
implied step-down provision" and did not cite to any authority supporting that proposition. 
In Utah, it is well-settled that appellate courts will not address arguments raised for 
the first time on appeal. See Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr.. 2003 UT 23,119; 
70 P.3d 904 (refusing to address any new arguments raised for the first time on appeal); 
Healthcare Services Group v. Utah Dep't. of Health, 2002 UT 5, n.4; 40 P.3d 591 (declining 
to reach the merits of new arguments raised for the first time on appeal); Carrier v. Salt Lake 
County, 2004 UT 98, |43; 104 P.3d 1208. 
4
 During the hearing on State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial 
court observed that DeHerrera failed to cite to any cases supporting her position. (R. 171, 
p. 14.) The trial court asked DeHerrera's counsel if there was any case law that was 
contrary to the case law relied on by State Farm that specifically supported DeHerrera's 
argument. DeHerrera's counsel indicated that he thought Speros, supra, came close, but 
referred the court to no other authority. (R. 171, pp. 13-14.) 
11 
DeHerrera allcnipls to fault the tnal court IW \t< decision, arguing that if erred in 
"f.iiliiie: -o arc1:" •' - consider" the mandates of Utah's "omnibus" statute. (Appellant's Brief, 
p. 10.) The trial court, howe\ er, considered each argument DeHerrera presented, and neither 
her "omnibus" argument, nor her "unlav/rai. i:rx::ec sicp-ac1.:: . i ; ^ .-<;.•:. _r. ..:r.o-lr 
thei i it It is entirety unfair for DeHerrera to attack: the trial court's ruling for failing to 
consider these arguments when neither was presented to the court for its consideration.5 
Because DeHeiTera did not present these arguments to the trial court, DeHerrera should not 
be allow ec :.; as^e:. -.A-^r \^-v :.~c :•* ?* :.r:e .*r. rc::e«i. 
h . DeHERRERA'S NEW LV RAISED ARGUMENTS LACK MERIT 
AND PROVIDE NO JUSTIFIABLE BASIS FOR DISTURBING THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DECISION. 
W hile State Farm objects to DeHerrera's attempt to rai.se ne v arguments for the first 
time 'C -::?rea; ^ v - -\r-r. "csoonds to each of these arguments as though they were properly 
preserved and explains why each lacks merit and in no way justifies disturbing the trial 
court's decision. 
\* t. lan ' s "onin.i.ir. *« d^n , J - O n-r require Mule Farm to 
provide liability coverage above the per person bodity injury limit 
of $50,000. 
DeHerrera asserts that Utah's "omnibus* sratuic, L tan ^oc^ Ann. ; .. . A - _ 2 - 3 U 3 , 
requires Stale Farm to provide separate liability :ovcrage of $50,000 for each individual 
" In her Statement of the Issues (Appellant's Brief, pp. i-2,), DeHerrera provides 
record citations purporting to show that her "omnibus" and "unlawful, implied step 
down" arguments were preserved. These citations, however, do not show that either of 
these issues were raised below or adequately preserved for appeal. 
12 
insured under Pacheco's policy who allegedly bears responsibility for the subject accident. 
The plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303 does not support DeHerrera's 
argument, but instead supports just the opposite. The portion of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-
303 cited by DeHerrera does not connect the coverage it requires to the individual insured(s) 
as she suggests, instead, it connects the coverage to the particular insured motor vehicle. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303 provides, in relevant part: 
(l)(a) In addition to complying with the requirements of Chapter 21 and Part 
II of Chapter 22, a policy of motor vehicle liability coverage under Subsection 
31A-22-302(l)(a)shall: 
(ii)(A) if it is an owner's policy, designate by appropriate reference all the 
motor vehicles on which coverage is granted, insure the person named in the 
policy, insure any other person using any named motor vehicle with the 
express or implied permission of the named insured, and, except as provided 
in Subsection (7) insure any person included in Subsection (l)(a)(iii) against 
loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance, or use of these motor vehicles within the United 
States and Canada, subject to limits... for each motor vehicle^ in amounts 
not less than the minium limits specified under Section 31A-22-304; 
(Emphasis added.) 
State Farm does not disagree with DeHerrera's assertion that Utah Code Ann. § 31A-
22-303 requires it to insure permissive users of insured motor vehicles. What State Farm 
does disagree with is DeHerrera's assertion that Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303 requires it 
to insure individuals under separate bodily injury limits when there is only one person injured 
in a single accident. As set forth above, the language of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303 
specifically connects the required coverage to the specific motor vehicle upon which 
13 
coverage is •:;•.. :._:JI..
 A . .-
 5;a:u:e refer' v " "*-%: "• "':~-C ~c *^ n *•• ~:c!: :>weraee is granted," 
and expressly states that such coverage is "subject to limits . . . for each motor vehicle;" 
U.C.A. § 31A-22-303. Nowhere uz Utah Code Ann. S 31A-22-303 does it state that the 
required coverage is "sucjecr ic m r r - . . . : . : J U ' . ; . ...» » :••" :-; ' , . : /•.,-m.^reo •;• ir :di.-:'' '" 
Paeheeo\s State F:inn policy K an owner's policy and the portion of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-22-3G3 DeHerrera relies on in her brief relates to the requirements of an "owner's 
policy." The statute, however, also contains a portion that discusses an "operator s ;:o:: ;\. 
See U.C.A. § 31 A-22-303( 1 )(a)(ii)(A)-(B) 
Recently, the Utah Supreme Court discussed Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303, and the 
differences between "owner's coverage" and "operator's coverage." in I aihoun \. .state 
Farm Mut. Auto, ins, v o., _ J - : . : ' : .*_•-.••; r.}-. ••. ,•...:." .r -.:a:; '*••': ' :.\" ' \^\- v ' ^ \ 
t 3" -.-13-3 ^ :i— .j ^v-mod mmrhe legislature intended for an owners policy to provide 
coverage with respect to a particular vehicle, and for an operator's policy to provide 
coverage for a particular individual. . £.mpnas;s aooeo. . nc .-.• „\:. . -..: . 
By definition, the term ' juner is closely associated with a specific vehicle, 
see id. §§ 31A-22-30U6). 41-12a-103(8)(a) (defining "owner' as 'a person 
who holds legal title to a motor vehicle'), while the term "operator' is more 
closely associated with the specific individual, see id. §§ 31A-22-301(5), 41-
12a-103(7) (defining 'operator" as "every person who .is in actual physical 
controi of a motor vehicle' \. 
See id. at 1|?! 
Under both the plain language of Utah Code Arm. ? 31 A-22-303, and the Utah 
Supreme Court's explanation of the same, it is clear that the coverage required of an. owner's 
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policy is connected to the specific motor vehicle on which coverage is granted, not the 
insured individual(s) under the policy. This conclusion is bolstered by the language of Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-22-304, which provides, in pertinent part: 
Policies containing motor vehicle liability coverage may not limit the insurer's 
liability under that coverage below the following: 
(l)(a) $25,000 because of liability for bodily injury to or death of one person, 
arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in any one accident. 
(Emphasis added.) Here again, the minimum amount of liability coverage required by statute 
is connected to "a motor vehicle," not the individual insured(s). The State Farm policy in this 
case granted coverage on Pacheco's vehicle with a per person bodily injury limit of $50,000. 
Nothing under Utah's statutory insurance scheme requires or suggests that State Farm must 
extend coverage beyond the $50,000 per person bodily injury limit simply because more than 
one insured may bear some responsibility for causing the subject accident. 
In her brief, DeHerrera attempts to draw support for her "omnibus" argument through 
a few select cases from outside jurisdictions. In essence, the courts in these cases have found 
the language of their jurisdiction's particular "omnibus" statute to require an insurer to 
provide separate per person liability limits for each individual qualifying as an insured. 
These cases represent a small minority view that has been rejected by most courts. See 
Schulte v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co.. 699 N.W.2d 437, n.3 (S.D. 2005) ("a majority of 
courts have rejected theories of separate recoverable limits in one accident from two 
insureds"). In addition, the statutory language analyzed by the courts in these cases is 
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distinguishable from Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-3 03, and provides no persuasive support for 
DeHerrera5 s interpretation of Utah statutory law. See Miller v. Amundson, 345 N. W.2d 494 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1984) (analyzing dissimilar statutory language); Iaquinta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
510 N.W.2d 715 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (analyzing dissimilar statutory language); Haislip v. 
Southern Heritage Ins. Co., 492 S.E.2d 135 (Va. 1997) (analyzing dissimilar statutory 
language).6 
Courts that have analyzed omnibus statutes sharing the same or similar language as 
that found in Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-303 have rejected the theory that per person liability 
limits must be provided separately for each individual insured. In general, these courts have 
found that the omnibus statute connects the required coverage to the particular insured 
vehicle and that the limits of liability do not increase because more than one insured may be 
liable for causing a single accident. 
In Schulte v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 699N.W.2d437 (S.D. 2005), the plaintiff 
was injured in an automobile accident that occurred when another driver, Joshua Hoftiezer, 
failed to yield the right-of-way. Joshua was operating a truck owned and insured by his 
father, Thomas Hoftiezer. Thomas was the named insured and held an "owners policy" 
issued by Progressive Northern Insurance Company ("Progressive"). Under the terms of the 
6
 In her brief, DeHerrera cites to the case of Viking Ins. Co. of Wisconsin v. 
Petersen, 784 P.2d 437 (Ore. 1989) in support of her position. However, not only does 
the Viking case involve statutory language unlike Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-303, it also 
involves issues not relevant to this appeal. The Viking court did not analyze the issue of 
whether the insurer had an obligation to extend separate per person liability limits per the 
number of negligent insureds. 
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policy, Joshua was considered an additional insured. The policy provided liability limits of 
$100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident 
Following the accident, Progressive offered the plaintiff $100,000 in exchange for a 
full and final release of any claims against Progressive and the Hoftiezers. While the 
plaintiffs damages exceeded $100,000, it was Progressive's position that $100,000 was the 
total limit of liability coverage available. The plaintiff brought a declaratory action against 
Progressive seeking a determination that Progressive was required to provide separate 
liability limits for each insured liable for the accident, Joshua Hoftiezer (for negligence) and 
Thomas Hoftiezer (for negligent entrustment). On cross-motions for summary judgment, the 
trial court rejected the plaintiffs argument and concluded that Progressive was under no 
obligation to pay separate per person liability limits. The plaintiff subsequently appealed. 
Similar to this case, the plaintiff argued that South Dakota's financial responsibility 
law - specifically, its omnibus statute, required Progressive to extend separate coverage up 
to the per person limit for each insured. South Dakota's omnibus clause provided, in relevant 
part: 
An owner's policy of liability insurance . . . shall insure the person named 
therein and any other person as insured, using any insured vehicle or vehicles 
with express or implied permission of the named insured, against loss from the 
liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance, or use of the vehicle or vehicles within the United States of 
America or the Dominion of Canada, subject to limits exclusive of interests 
and costs, with respect to each insured vehicle. . . . 
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Id. at 439. (Italic emphasis original; bold emphasis added.)7 Based on the plain language of 
South Dakota's omnibus clause, the court found that plaintiffs position could not be 
sustained. The court explained: 
Each vehicle in South Dakota must be covered by the obligatory liability limits 
in the event the owner or other person named in the policy used the vehicle and 
causes personal injury or property damage. Nothing in these statutes suggests 
that the Legislature intended that the limits of liability should multiply 
depending on the number of negligent acts by insureds legally liable for 
causing a single accident. Accordingly, we find no support in our laws to 
require an insurer to pay policy limits for the permissive vehicle user for 
negligently causing an accident and the insured owner for negligently 
entrusting the vehicle, so that one injured party in a single accident may 
recover the policy limits from each. 
Id. at p. 440. (Emphasis original.) Based on the foregoing, the court affirmed the trial court's 
decision, finding that Progressive was under no obligation to extend separate per person 
liability limits for each insured. 
In Infinity Ins. Co. v. Dodson. 14 P.3d 487 (Mont. 2000), the Supreme Court of 
Montana reached the same result as the court in Schulte. In that case, Paul Christeck owned 
a vehicle insured through Infinity Insurance Company ("Infinity"). The Infinity policy 
provided coverage in the amount of the minimum statutory requirement, $50,000 per accident 
involving two or more injured persons. 
7
 Unlike the omnibus statutes in the cases relied on by DeHerrera, the omnibus 
statute in Schulte contains language almost identical to that found in Utah Code Ann. § 
31A-22-303. 
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On December 7, 1997, Christeck gave Jessica Vannatta, an unlicensed 16-year-old 
with little driving experience, permission to use the insured vehicle. The vehicle was 
subsequently involved in a one-car rollover accident that resulted in the death of Vannatta, 
and the injury of three other passengers. Following the accident, two of the injured 
passengers made claims against Vannatta for negligence and against Christeck for negligent 
entrustment. In a declaratory action, Infinity sought a judicial determination as to its 
coverage obligations. The injured passengers, Holly Dodson and Kortnee Azure, claimed 
that Infinity was required to extend the policy's per accident liability limits to both Christeck, 
as vehicle owner and named insured, as well as Vannatta, as permissive user of the vehicle. 
As part of their argument, Dodson and Azure asserted that Montana's omnibus statute 
required Infinity to provide up to the $50,000 per accident limit for each insured liable for 
the accident. Infinity argued that its policy, as well as state law, clearly limited the total 
amount of coverage available for one accident to $50,000, and that the number of individual 
insureds responsible for the accident did not increase this amount. Montana's omnibus 
statute provided: 
(2) The owner's policy of liability insurance must: 
(b) insure the person named therein and any other person, as insured, using the 
motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or implied permission of the 
named insured, against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the motor vehicle or motor 
vehicles within the United States of America or the Dominion of Canada, 
subject to limits exclusive of interest and costs, with respect to each motor 
vehicle . . . 
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Id. at 493. (Emphasis added.)8 The court found that the plain language of Montana's 
omnibus statute required an "owner's policy" to provide abase amount of coverage, $25,000 
per person, $50,000 per accident. See idL at 496. The court went on to state, "[t]he operative 
language of this statute, however, requires that the foregoing is: 'subject to limits exclusive 
of interest and costs, with respect to each motor vehicle " IcL at 496-97. (Italic emphasis 
original; bold emphasis added.) The court explained: 
[tjhus, each vehicle in Montana - not each insured - must be cloaked by the 
foregoing mandatory limits in the event it causes damage to persons or 
property, regardless of who is behind the wheel. Accordingly, this Court 
cannot give effect to any purpose beyond this language. 
We can find no evidence that the Montana Legislature ever contemplated, let 
alone wished to require, that the minimum limits of liability . . . could or 
should be increased depending on the number of insureds found legally liable 
for causing one accident. The overall purpose of the Act . . . was for the 
'elimination of reckless and irresponsible drivers of motor vehicles from the 
highways of the state of Montana. . . . This intent - to shield the public from 
reckless and irresponsible drivers - is expressed under the' each motor vehicle' 
limitation... meaning each vehicle, regardless of ownership, must be covered 
by the mandatory liability limits when in use on the roadways of Montana. 
Id. at 497.9 Based on the language of Montana's omnibus statute, the court concluded the 
8
 Again, unlike the cases relied on by DeHerrera, the language in the omnibus 
statute analyzed in Infinity is nearly identical to the language found in Utah Code Ann. § 
31A-22-303. 
9
 In her brief, DeHerrera asserts that the trial court's decision undermines the 
purpose of the omnibus statute, stating "the Utah legislature could not have intended such 
sophistry when the very purpose of the omnibus statute is to protect persons such as 
Appellant DeHerrera from the horrors of injury at the hands of multiple defendants." 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 19.) The legislative intent DeHerrera attempts to ascribe to the 
omnibus statute is clearly a stretch. First, the plain language of the statute demonstrates 
that the intent was to ensure that each insured vehicle have a minimum amount of liability 
protection available to accident victims, irrespective of whether it is the named insured or 
a permissive user behind the wheel, (continued . . . ) 
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trial court correctly found that Infinity was obligated to pay the $50,000 per accident liability 
limit on the behalf of both insureds, but no more. 
The courts in Schulte and Infinity are not alone in rejecting the argument that omnibus 
statutes similar to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303 require insurers to extend separate liability 
limits to each negligent insured. In x\merican Standard Ins. Co. of Wisconsin v. May, 972 
S. W.2d 595 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998), the Missouri Court of Appeals analyzed an omnibus statute 
almost identical to Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-303. The Missouri court found there to be no 
support for the respondent's argument that Missouri's omnibus statute required the appellant 
insurance company to extend separate per person bodily injury liability limits for multiple 
insureds. The court reasoned, "giving the language of [Missouri's omnibus statute] its plain 
and ordinary meaning, we find that the policy limits are directed to the insured vehicles of 
[the insured], not the insureds, and requires that each insured vehicle be insured for the 
minimum MVFRL [Missouri's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law] limits, $25,000 
per person and $50,000 per occurrence." I<1 at 600. 
Similarly, in GRE Ins. Group v. Green. 980 P.2d 963 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999), the Court 
of Appeals of Arizona rej ected the argument that Arizona' s omnibus statute required insurers 
to provide separate bodily injury liability limits to each negligent insured. The court 
(continued . . . ) This is consistent with the legislative intent the courts found underlying 
the omnibus statutes in Schulte and Infinity. Second, DeHerrera's claim that the omnibus 
statute was intended to protect persons like herself from injury caused by "multiple 
defendants" is nonsensical, as an injured accident victim is entitled to only one recovery. 
It is not the number of defendants, but rather her injuries, that determines the amount of 
damages DeHerrera is entitled to recover. 
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explained: 
[tjhere is nothing in the language of the statute, nor do we find any other 
authority, that supports the argument that the statute requires insurers to cover 
the permissive user for negligently causing the accident and the named insured 
for negligent entrustment leading to the same accident so that one injured party 
may recover twice the statutory minimum. Rather, it seems that the intent of 
the statute is that, whether the named insured or a permissive user is operating 
the vehicle and causes the accident, the policy must provide at least $15,000 
[the statutory minimum] in coverage for each injured person subject to the 
overall per-accident limit. Thus, we conclude that [Arizona's omnibus statute] 
does not prevent [the insurer] from providing in its policy that the limit of 
liability for damages to one person in one auto accident is $15,000 regardless 
of the number of insureds or claims made. 
Id. at 966. (Emphasis original.) 
As demonstrated above, courts that have analyzed omnibus statutes similar to Utah's 
have rejected DeHerrera's theory that an insurer is required to provide separate per person 
liability limits for each insured individual liable for causing a single accident. The coverage 
required under these statutes applies to the particular insured vehicle, not the individual 
insured. Again, the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303 provides: 
(ii)(A) if it is an owner's policy, designate by appropriate reference all the 
motor vehicles on which coverage is granted, insure the person named in the 
policy, insure any other person using any named motor vehicle with the 
express or implied permission of the named insured, and, except as provided 
in Subsection (7) insure any person included in Subsection (l)(a)(iii) against 
loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance, or use of these motor vehicles within the United 
States and Canada, subject to limits . . . for each motor vehicle, in amounts 
not less than the minium limits specified under Section 31A-22-304; 
(Emphasis added.) DeHerrera's interpretation of Utah's omnibus statute is inconsistent with 
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the express language found therein.10 The language of Utah's omnibus statute makes it clear 
that the coverage it requires is connected to the insured motor vehicle, not the individual 
insured. While DeHerrera purports to recognize the rules of proper statutory interpretation 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 18), it is clear that her approach runs afoul of the most basic and well-
established principles. DeHerrera's interpretation of Utah's omnibus statute ignores certain 
statutory language - which the courts in Infinity, Schulte, and Standard found plainly 
connects the required coverage to the insured vehicle, and attempts to infer substantive terms 
that appear nowhere in the text. See State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, |34; 52 P.3d 1210 ("In 
analyzing a statute's plain language, we must attempt to give each part of the provision a 
10
 In the last paragraph of her "omnibus" argument, DeHerrera asserts that the 
legislature's use of the word "and" in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303 somehow manifests 
an intent by the legislature that each insured receive separate per person bodily injury 
coverage. (Appellee's Brief, p. 20.) DeHerrera asserts that because the statute requires 
coverage for the named insured "and" permissive users, this shows that the legislature 
intended the required coverage be applied per insured. This argument is not original, but 
is taken from Haislip v. Southern Heritage Ins. Co., 492 S.E.2d 135 (Va. 1993). While 
the language of the omnibus statute in Haislip is dissimilar to the language of Utah's 
omnibus statute, litigants seeking to recover multiple per person liability limits in other 
cases involving similarly worded statutes have attempted to use this argument as support 
for their position. These attempts have been widely unsuccessful. See e.g., American 
Standard, 972 S.W.2d at 600; Infinity, 14 P.3d at 495. In Infinity, the Supreme Court of 
Montana stated that it was unpersuaded by the Haislip court's attempt to divine legislative 
intent from the word "and", and indicated that a subsequent amendment to the omnibus 
statute by the Virginia General Assembly shows that the Haislip court erred in its 
decision. The Infinity court noted that in 1999, the Virginia Assembly tacked on an 
amendment to the omnibus statute stating: ". . . nothing contained in this section shall be 
deemed to prohibit an insurer from limiting its liability under any one policy for bodily 
injury or property damage resulting from any one accident or occurrence to the liability 
limits for such coverage set forth in the policy for any such accident or occurrence 
regardless of the number of insureds under that policy." Id at 495-96 (citing Va. Code 
Ann. § 38.2-2204 (1999)) (Emphasis original.) 
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relevant and independent meaning so as to give effect to all of its terms. . . . [A] statute's 
unambiguous language may not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning.") See also, 
Berrett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1994) (stating "[a] cardinal rale of 
statutory construction is that courts are not to infer substantive terms into the text that are not 
already there. Rather, the interpretation must be based on the language used, and the court 
has no power to rewrite the statute to conform to an intention not expressed.") 
Based on the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303, it is the insured 
vehicle that must be covered with liability protection satisfying the statutory minimum 
requirements, not the insured individual. This interpretation is consistent with the trial 
court's interpretation and application of Pacheco's State Farm policy, and is also the only 
interpretation possible under the established rules of statutory interpretation . Accordingly, 
DeHerrera's alternative interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303 lacks merit and must 
be rejected. 
B. DeHerrera's "implied step-down" argument is a product 
of her own misinterpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-
303, 
DeHerrera argues for the first time on appeal that the State Farm policy contains an 
unlawful "implied step-down" provision because it requires multiple insureds to share the 
policy's $50,000 per person bodily injury limit, thereby reducing the amount of coverage 
available for each insured to less than the minimum statutory requirement of $25,000. 
(Appellee's Brief, p. 30.) DeHerrera claims that because Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-303 
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requires State Farm to extend coverage to three negligent insureds (Pacheco, as owner and 
named insured; Olmos, as permissive user; and Martinez, also as a permissive user), 
restricting the amount of available coverage to a single $50,000 per person bodily injury limit 
would reduce (i.e., "step-down") the amount of coverage provided to each insured below the 
minimum statutory requirement of $25,000. The flaw in DeHerrera's argument is in its 
underlying premise. 
As set forth above, the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-303 are not directed 
to the insured individual(s); rather, the requirements are directed to the insured vehicle. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-303, an owner's policy requires that the particular "motor 
vehicles on which coverage is granted" be designated, and provides that the coverage must 
insure certain individuals "subject to limits.. .for each motor vehicle" (Emphasis added.) 
In a footnote, DeHerrera's misinterpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-303 is made clear 
when she states: "It is assumed that State Farm covered each of the three negligent parties 
for $50,000 since it did not argue below that either the permissive users were insured for less, 
or at least minimum statutory requirements." (Appellant's Brief, n. 6.) The liability limits 
set forth in Pacheco' s State Farm policy and the requirements set forth under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31 A-22-303 are not provided per insured individual, but are instead provided per insured 
vehicle. Pacheco's owner's policy provided coverage on his 2000 Pontiac Sunfire, with 
bodily injury liability coverage of $50,000 per person, $ 100,000 per accident. In no way was 
the amount of coverage provided on Pacheco's vehicle reduced or "stepped-down," it just 
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was not increased. Each insured under Pacheco's State Farm policy was extended coverage, 
they just happen to share the same liability subject to one liability limit. 
DeHerrera's assertion that State Farm must provide separate per person bodily injury 
coverage of $50,000 per insured is unworkable and would effectively do away with any limit 
to an insurer's liability. DeHerrera's argument, if accepted, would cause tremendous 
uncertainty in the insurance industry by eliminating insurance companies' ability to predict 
future claims and losses. For example, in the instant case, assume that instead of a Pontiac 
Sunfire, Pacheco's vehicle was a 15 passenger, Ford E-350 van, that was filled to capacity 
at the time of the accident. Assume further that the dispute between Martinez and Herrera 
resulted in a physical altercation involving the other passengers which caused Olmos to lose 
control of the van and crash. DeHerrera is the only passenger injured and decides to assert 
liability claims against Pacheco, Olmos and each of the other passengers, again claiming that 
each bore some responsibility for causing the accident. Under this scenario, DeHerrera could 
claim that Pacheco's State Farm policy and its $50,000 per person bodily injury limit would 
provide her with $750,000 worth of liability coverage ($50,000 per person, per individual 
insured). Needless to say, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for State Farm to be able 
to predict this type of loss when underwriting a policy and calculating premium payments. 
While it may not be everyday that a melee breaks out between passengers in large 
capacity vehicles, the above-scenario illustrates just how problematic DeHerrera's position 
is in this case - it would effectively eliminate the limit of liability insurers rely on in 
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predicting loss and would make underwriting virtually impossible. See Martinez v. Allstate 
Ins. Co.. 946 P.2d 240, 242 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting the plaintiffs claim that per 
person policy limits should be multiplied by the number of tortfeasors and stating, "[i]f [the 
plaintiff s] interpretation were adopted, there would be no limit to the insurer's liability when 
one person was injured by two or more tortfeasors. We will not construe the policy to reach 
an absurd result.") 
Equally illustrative as the van scenario, but far more common, DeHerrera's position 
would automatically double every automobile insurers' exposure anytime the vehicle owner 
gives another person permission to use his/her vehicle. As demonstrated by the case law set 
forth previously, it is neither rare nor novel for an injured accident victim to pursue a claim 
against the permissive user of an automobile for negligence, and against the owner for 
negligent entrustment DeHerrera' s position would effectively increase an insurers' exposure 
to twice the per person limit whenever a permissive user causes an accident. Clearly, this 
would be an absurd result that would only lead to higher premiums for all insurance 
customers and a decrease in the amount of affordable coverage options available to the 
consuming public. 
The plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303 makes it clear that the coverage 
required of an owner's policy applies to the particular insured vehicle, not the number of 
insured individuals. State Farm's policy does not reduce or "step-down" the coverage 
required under Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-303, it simply prevents the coverage from 
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increasing based on the number of individuals insured under the policy. 
III. PACHECO'S STATE FARM POLICY CLEARLY AND 
UNAMBIGUOUSLY LIMITS COVERAGE FOR DeHERRERA'S 
INJURIES TO $50,000. 
It is well-established under Utah law that "[a]n insurance policy is merely a contract 
between the insured and the insurer and is construed pursuant to the same rules applied to 
ordinary contracts. Whether an ambiguity exists in a contract is a question of law." Saleh 
v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2006 UT 1, P14 (quoting Alf v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 
1272,1274 (Utah 1993)). Courts determine the legal import of insurance policies, affording 
the policy terms their usually accepted meanings and giving effect to and harmonizing to the 
extent possible all policy provisions. See Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664, 665 (Utah 
1992). "[Ujnless the language of an insurance contract is ambiguous or unclear, the court 
must construe it according to its plain and ordinary meaning." First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. 
Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah 1998). 
In this case, Pacheco purchased a policy of insurance from State Farm entitled "Your 
State Farm Car Policy." The policy sets forth the terms of coverage and its limitations. 
Under Section I - Liability - Coverage A, the policy provides: 
We will: 
1. pay damages which an insured becomes legally liable to pay because of: 
a. bodily injury to others, 
caused by an accident resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of 
your car, . . . . 
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(R. 107) (Emphasis original.) The policy also contains a limits of liability provision which 
states: 
Limits of Liability 
The amount of bodily injury liability coverage is shown on the declarations 
page under "Limits of Liability - Coverage A - Bodily Injury. Each Person, 
Each Accident". Under "Each Person" is the amount of coverage for all 
damages due to bodily injury to one person. "Bodily Injury to one person 
includes all injury and damages to others resulting from this bodily injury, and 
all emotional distress resulting from this bodily injury sustained by the other 
persons who do not sustain bodily injury. Under "Each Accident" is the total 
amount of coverage, subject to the amount shown under "Each Person", for all 
damages due to bodily injury to two or more persons in the same accident. 
We will pay damages for which an insured is legally liable up to these 
amounts. 
The limits of liability are not increased because more than one person or 
organization may be an insured. 
(R. 108.) (Italic emphasis original; underline emphasis added.) Pacheco purchased liability 
coverage with a $50,000 - Each Person limit. Under the plain language of the policy, 
$50,000 is the "amount of coverage for all damages due to bodily injury to one person" (R. 
108.) In addition, the plain language of the policy specifically states that this $50,000 - Each 
Person limit is "not increased because more than one person . . . may be an insured." (See 
id.) As set forth below, courts analyzing policy language the same or similar to that found 
in Pacheco's State Farm policy have found that such language clearly limits coverage to the 
Each Person limit, regardless of the number of insured individuals involved in causing a 
single accident. 
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In Murbach v. Noel 798 N.E.2d 810 (111. Ct. App. 2003), the plaintiff filed suit 
against Shane Steele and Susan Noel for personal injuries arising out of an automobile 
accident. Steele and Noel were traveling in a vehicle owned by Steele and insured under a 
policy issued by State Farm. Noel was operating the vehicle with Steele's permission, so 
both were insureds under the policy. Steele had loaded a bedframe, mattress, and box spring 
onto the vehicle. The items fell off the vehicle onto the roadway causing a collision that 
resulted in injuries to the plaintiff. The plaintiff subsequently obtained a judgment against 
both Steele and Noel. State Farm had already paid the plaintiff $100,000, which was the 
limit of liability available under Steele's policy for bodily injury to one person. However, 
in a garnishment proceeding against State Farm, the plaintiff asserted that she was entitled 
to an additional $100,000 under the policy, claiming that the policy provided coverage of 
$100,000 per person, per insured. State Farm maintained that the limits of liability were 
fixed at $100,000, regardless of the number of insureds liable for the accident. 
Analyzing the exact policy provision at issue in this case, the Illinois Court of Appeals 
rejected the plaintiff s claim that State Farm was required to extend the $ 100,000 per person 
liability limit per individual insured. The court stated: 
it is already clear that State Farm's liability is limited to the stated dollar 
amounts per person and accident. In interpreting the policy, we must attempt 
to give meaning to all its terms. General Casualty Co. of Illinois v. Juhl, 283 
111. App. 3d 376, 380, 218 111. Dec. 685, 669 N.E.2d 1211 (1996). The only 
reasonable reading of the restriction that gives it meaning and effect is that 
the per-person and per-accident limits of liability define State Farm's 
maximum total obligation under the policy regardless of the number of 
insureds who are liable for damages. 
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Id. at 812. (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, the court held that the limit of liability set forth 
in the State Farm policy did not increase simply because there were two insureds involved 
in causing the accident. 
Numerous courts analyzing policy provisions functionally equivalent to the limitation 
of liability provision in this case have found them to unambiguously limit coverage for injury 
to one person to the stated per person limit, irrespective of the number of insureds under the 
policy. See e ^ , Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Shutt 845 P.2d 86, 89 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993) 
(finding that the policy language clearly states that the insured will pay no more than the 
maximum bodily injury liability limit for bodily injury sustained by one person, regardless 
of the number of insureds); Manriquez v. Mid-Century Ins. Co. of Texas, 779 S.W.2d 482, 
485 (Tx. Ct. App. 1989), overruled on other grounds, (finding that the policy language 
expressly limited coverage to the per person limit, regardless of the number of covered 
persons, and stating "[t]he fact that two defendants are being sued would not enlarge this 
limitation"); GRE Ins. Group v. Green, 980 P.2d 963,966 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that 
the policy language plainly limited coverage to the per person bodily injury limit, regardless 
of the number of insureds); Infinity Ins. Co. v. Dodson. 14 P.3d 487, 497 (Mont. 2000) 
(affirming the district court's determination that under a similar limits of liability provision, 
the maximum amount paid by the insurer remains constant and that the fact an accident 
involves multiple liable insureds is inconsequential). 
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In this case, the trial court determined that the language of Pacheco's State Farm 
policy was neither vague nor ambiguous. (R. 151.) The trial court determined that the policy 
clearly provided liability coverage up to $50,000 per injured person for one accident, 
regardless of whether more than one person is insured for the accident under the policy. (See 
id.) DeHerrera argues on appeal that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the State 
Farm policy. (Appellant's Brief, p. 25.) DeHerrera, however, provides no plausible 
alternative interpretation of the policy language. 
In her brief, DeHerrera attempts to dissect certain language found in the State Farm 
policy in an effort to support her position that each insured is entitled to separate per person 
liability coverage up to $50,000. (Appellant's Brief, p. 24.) With respect to the following 
policy language which provides, "[t]he limits of liability are not increased because more than 
one person . . . may be insured," DeHerrera argues that her interpretation does not actually 
"increase" the "limits of liability" at all. (See id, p. 25.) DeHerrera contends that the 
"limits of liability" are kept the same, but are simply applied to each negligent insured under 
the policy. (See id.; see also, id at p. 28.) This same argument was made by the plaintiff in 
Murbach. In rejecting this argument, the Illinois Court of Appeals stated: 
[a]lthough plaintiff argues that requiring an insurer to make multiple payments 
of the policy limits is somehow different from increasing the limits, we are 
unable to perceive any meaningful distinction. If State Farm is liable for 
$200,000 on account of injuries to a single person, then its stated $100,000 
limit of liability obviously has been increased. 
Murbach. 798 N.E.2d at 812. 
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Recently, in Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 2006 UT 1, f 15, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated, "[a] contract may be ambiguous because it is unclear, it omits terms, or 'the terms 
used to express the intention of the parties may be understood to have two or more plausible 
meanings.'" The court went on to state, "to earn the designation of plausible, a notion, 
explanation, or interpretation must impart confidence in its credibility sufficient to merit our 
applause. A standing ovation is not required, a discreet collision of the palms will do, but 
there must be reason to applaud." Id, at ^fl6. 
DeHerrera's interpretation of Pacheco's State Farm policy merits no applause, as it 
is based on a strained and disjointed reading which attempts to render express policy 
language completely meaningless. The limits of liability provision set forth in the policy 
makes it clear that the policy limit of $50,000 for bodily injury to one person is not increased 
based on the number of insured individuals. Again, this same provision has previously been 
interpreted as clearly and unambiguously limiting coverage in accordance with State Farm's 
interpretation (see Murbacfau supra, 798 N.E.2d 810 (111. Ct. App. 2003)), and DeHerrera has 
presented no compelling reason or authority for it to be interpreted differently. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF PACHECO'S 
STATE FARM POLICY IS CONSISTENT WITH UTAH PUBLIC 
POLICY, 
It is generally understood that it is the responsibility of the legislature to determine 
public policy. £ee Berube v. Fashion Centre. Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1043 (Utah 1989) 
("Public policy is most obviously, but not exclusively, embodied in legislative enactments. 
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The legislature, acting in consonance with constitutional principles and expressing the will 
of the people, determines that which is in the public interest and serves the public good.") 
With respect to motor vehicle insurance, the legislature has determined that public policy 
requires certain mandatory forms of security or coverage. 
In this case, DeHerrera suggests that the trial court's interpretation of Pacheco's State 
Farm policy violates Utah public policy because the policy's limits of liability provision is 
an unclear exclusion that limits coverage to below the minimum statutorily required amount. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 27-29.)11 Here again, DeHerrera's argument is based on a flawed 
premise.12 
Through statutory enactments, the Utah legislature has proclaimed that public policy 
requires vehicle owners to secure liability coverage up to a certain minimum amount. In 
Speros v. Fricke, 2004 UT 69, f42; 98 P.3d 28, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
11
 DeHerrera's attempt to cast the limits of liability provision found in Pacheco's 
policy as a policy exclusion is unwarranted. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 26-27.) Insurance 
policy exclusions have the effect of taking away coverage that has been extended under 
the covering language of the policy. The limits of liability provision set forth in the State 
Farm policy, however, is part of the covering language which defines the amount of 
coverage. The limits of liability provision does not take away or exclude coverage 
whatsoever. It merely defines the amount of available coverage. Because the limits of 
liability provision is not a policy exclusion, the case law DeHerrera relies on in arguing 
that the provision should be treated as an unclear exclusion is inapplicable. 
12
 For the sake of brevity, State Farm foregoes re-responding to DeHerrera's 
assertion that the limits of liability provision is unclear, as that point is addressed in 
Section III of this brief. 
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The Utah legislature has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme mandating 
minimum coverage for motor vehicles. See id. §§ 31A-22-303 to -304. This 
legislative enactment reflects public policy requiring vehicle owners to carry 
a minimum level of liability coverage to protect innocent victims of 
automobile accidents. 
(Emphasis added.) Under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-304, the legislature provided that 
insurance policies issued to vehicle owners may not limit liability coverage below $25,000 
for bodily injury or death of one person, arising out of any one motor vehicle accident. 
In her brief, DeHerrera asserts that Utah public policy was violated when the trial 
court interpreted Pacheco's State Farm policy as limiting the amount of liability coverage 
available to her to $50,000, regardless of the number of negligent individuals insured under 
the policy. (See Appellant's Brief, pp. 26-30.) As indicated previously, DeHerrera fails to 
recognize that it is the motor vehicle upon which liability coverage is granted, not the 
particular individual(s) using the vehicle. Here, the language of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-
304 warrants repeating: 
Policies containing motor vehicle liability coverage may not limit the insurer's 
liability under that coverage below the following: 
(l)(a) $25,000 because of liability for bodily injury to or death of one person, 
arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in any one accident: 
U.C.A. § 31A-22-304. (Emphasis added.) 
Utah public policy, as manifested in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-304, requires a motor 
vehicle insurance policy to provide liability coverage of at least $25,0000 "for bodily injury 
to . . . one person, arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in any one accident." The 
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language of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-304 clearly provides that the minimum statutorily 
required coverage applies to the particular motor vehicle. Thus, the trial court's 
interpretation and application of Pacheco's State Farm policy is perfectly consistent with 
Utah public policy as expressed in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-304. 
V. DeHERRERA IS A THIRD-PARTY TO PACHECO'S STATE FARM 
POLICY AND CANNOT CLAIM THE BENEFIT OF PREFERENTIAL 
RULES OF POLICY INTERPRETATION. 
DeHerrera was not a party to the insurance contract between Pacheco and State Farm. 
DeHerrera apparently loses sight of this fact when, in the final pages of her brief, she argues 
that the State Farm policy is ambiguous and should be construed in favor of the insured. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 34.) DeHerrera contends, "the insurance policy must be construed in 
light of how the average, reasonable purchaser of insurance would understand the language 
of the policy as a whole and the policy should be construed in favor of coverage." (See id., 
p. 35) (citing Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Versaw, 2004 UT 73; 99 P.3d 796; USF&G v. Sandt 
854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993)). 
The cases DeHerrera relies on in support of her assertion that the State Farm policy 
must be construed in favor of coverage are cases brought by insureds against their insurers 
seeking first-party benefits. In these situations, when courts are called on to construe 
insurance contracts that are subject to differing interpretations - one favoring coverage and 
the other denying coverage, courts will construe the policy against the insurer and in favor 
coverage. See e.g., Sandt 854 P.2d at 522-23. 
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DeHerrera, a third-party, is the only one claiming the policy is ambiguous. When the 
dispute over the interpretation of an insurance contract is not between the insurer and the 
insured, but rather a third-party, it is entirely inappropriate to apply preferential rules of 
policy interpretation.13 
DeHerrera released the individuals insured under the State Farm policy (Pacheco, 
Olmos and Martinez) from any personal liability arising from the subject accident. (R. 65.)14 
DeHerrera reserved the right to seek additional compensation to the extent there was any 
additional liability coverage available under policy. While State Farm does not seek to 
preclude DeHerrera from making the argument for additional compensation, State Farm 
vigorously objects to DeHerrera's attempt to gain an advantage by asking the Court to apply 
principles of contract interpretation that construe the policy against State Farm and in favor 
of coverage. These preferential rules of interpretation must be confined to first-party 
situations, and it would be manifestly unfair for them to be applied outside of that limited 
context. 
13
 State Farm does not argue that DeHerrera's lacks standing to challenge its 
interpretation of Pacheco's State Farm policy, rather, she just cannot claim the benefit of 
preferential rules of contract interpretation applicable in the first-party (insurer v. insured) 
context. 
14
 In her brief, DeHerrera attempts to argue that State Farm's position is 
unreasonable because Pacheco paid premiums with the expectation that "each driver and 
user as defined in the policy would be protected . . . ." (Appellant's Brief, p. 36.) 
DeHerrera apparently fails to recognize that in this case each driver and user was indeed 
protected. State Farm tendered the policy's per person limit of $50,000 in exchange for a 
release all claims against Pacheco, Olmos and Martinez for any personal liability. (R. 
65.) 
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CONCLUSION 
State Farm is entitled to enforce the limits of liability provision set for in Pacheco's 
State Farm policy. The language of the provision unambiguously limits the amount of 
liability coverage for bodily injury to one person to $50,000, regardless of the number of 
individuals insured under the policy. DeHerrera's claim that the limits of liability may 
increase based on the number of insureds liable for causing the accident is directly contrary 
to the plain language of the policy. 
The trial court did not err in its interpretation of the State Farm policy, nor did it 
violate Utah public policy in determining that the amount of liability coverage available to 
DeHerrera was limited to $50,000. In addition, while DeHerrera failed to preserve her 
argument that the State Farm policy violates the requirements of Utah's omnibus statute, and 
that it creates an "implied step-down," these arguments lack merit and provide no rational 
basis for disturbing the trial court's ruling. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should affirm the judgment of the trial court, and 
award State Farm its costs incurred in defending this appeal. 
DATED this J day of February, 2006. 
STRONG & HANNI 
B y * ^ 
Stuart H. Schultz ^ 5 
A. Joseph Sano 
Attorneys for State Farm 
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